I’m a bit confused. What facts did you see that I missed?
I was asking for the legal basis of DOJ involvement.
The answer was that Dhillon is “based,” followed by her political record. That speaks to motive and character, not legal authority or facts.
It is good to see someone willing to enforce the law, but there is considerably more to this case than that.
Looking for the actual legal facts, DOJ filed its own action rather than intervening in the Jewish plaintiffs’ suit.
The complaint relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345 for jurisdiction, 34 U.S.C. § 12601 for enforcement authority, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 for declaratory and equitable relief.
That makes the case more unusual.
Section 12601 has traditionally been associated with patterns or practices of systemic law enforcement misconduct: excessive force, unlawful stops, searches or arrests, discriminatory policing, and similar conduct.
We’re discussing Jewish identity and Dhillon’s politics while the operative legal theory is entirely different.
The question now is why DOJ chose this comparatively new application of § 12601, how comfortably the facts fit the statutory requirement of a “pattern or practice,” and what rule the court may establish if it accepts the theory.
It is not about arguing. It is about discernment.
Montgomery County enacted the ordinance on July 27, and DOJ sued on August 3.
The complaint does not identify a developed history of arrests, prosecutions, or repeated enforcement under this ordinance. It relies principally on the ordinance, the officers’ duty to enforce it, and allegations that enforcement is occurring or will occur.
DOJ itself has traditionally described § 12601 as a remedy for systematic law enforcement misconduct, with isolated conduct ordinarily being insufficient. Here, DOJ appears to push the theory further by treating a newly enacted ordinance and its expected enforcement as the relevant pattern or practice.
“Shall not be infringed” states the constitutional right and should control the merits. But it does not, by itself, give DOJ a cause of action. Section 12601 is the statutory vehicle DOJ selected, and that choice deserves scrutiny.
The complaint itself establishes no precedent. The danger depends upon what the court accepts and how broadly it states its ruling.
If a newly enacted local law, coupled mainly with the expectation that police will enforce it, is enough to constitute a federal “pattern or practice,” that mechanism will not remain limited to Second Amendment cases or remain forever in friendly hands.
A future Attorney General could use the same reasoning to pressure cities and sheriffs over how they police gun owners, political demonstrators, churches, street preachers, or other disfavored groups.
The government agency would be the named defendant, but citizens would live under the resulting injunctions, rewritten policies, federal monitoring, and consent decrees.
Patriots cannot become so desperate for government to defend their rights that they stop examining the power it uses to do so.
A favorable action does not automatically make the method sound.
“Dhillon is based” may explain why people trust her motives. It does not answer whether this particular expansion of federal authority is necessary, wise, or prudent.
That may be exactly the problem, we may be welcoming in a Trojan horse for future expanded federal power and it may be every nicely done.
My original concern is not diminished, it’s broadened, no facts to bank on, just hopium.
