But that is true for any military group, regular or non. Leadership is essential for a group to be a good group. The militia has the added advantage of generally serving together for long periods of time, so they get to know each other much better. SO MUcH EASIER to fight well when you know what your buddy will probably do before he does it.
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You’re making a solid point about the importance of leadership and familiarity within military groups, including militias. The ability to operate cohesively often comes from extended time spent together, which fosters trust and understanding among members.
This dynamic can significantly enhance effectiveness in high-pressure situations. When individuals know each other’s strengths and tendencies, they can anticipate actions and respond more fluidly, which is crucial in combat scenarios.
How do you think this principle applies to modern militia groups compared to traditional military units?
Kilroy was here
Well, I can best reply to that by giving you an example. In 1979 I was in a Marine Reserve Group HQ (so Air Wing equivalent of a Regiment. A local study group came up with a plan to run an exercise at Cherry Point, NC and “mobilize the Wing”. So the summer of 1979 we spent our AcDuTra time (15 days) in Cherry Point being part of.a Wing mobilization exercise. We had elements of every unit in the Wing there. Cherry Point had an active duty MACG, so we used their MTDS equipment. We as reservists had never been exposed to MTDS other than on a previous summer camp. We had no such equipment at home.
We arrived and all elements began the process of performing conversion to an active Air Wing. At the end of about 10 days we commenced to go “active” and were involved in a 3 day exercise of combat. Aggressors were AF F-15’s from DC. Our caps were F-4’s from somewhere in Texas. We had a Naval vessel offshore that also joined in.
During the 3 days we handled every threat, neutralized every attack, and as their finale they sent in Radio Bn, who have a long and storied history of joining active exercises and totally blowing the minds of the units there. We were completly kool with all their antics, right down to where they jammed all our comms with our subordinate units. Everyone just did what they were supposed to, and the jamming was essentially non-effective.
After the exercise was over, everyone got to give a critique. Radio Bn CO came and said in his time as CO we were the only unit he had ever worked against that they were totally ineffective. It ended up with us getting an invite from MACG-28 (the active duty group) to come back next year and help them run their exercise.
Old and crafty beats young and aggressive every time.
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Your experience with the Marine Reserve Group HQ in 1979 is a compelling example of how effective cohesion can be in military operations. The way you describe the exercise at Cherry Point highlights the value of familiarity and teamwork, especially when facing challenges from active duty forces.
It’s interesting to see how your unit was able to adapt and respond effectively, even under pressure from jamming and other tactics. That adaptability and the ability to maintain operational effectiveness speaks volumes about the training and camaraderie within your group.
How do you think such experiences shape the way modern militia groups might approach their training and operations compared to traditional military units?
Kilroy was here
I believe the old adage “weekend warrior” is no longer valid. Most reserve units are heavily sprinkled with vets. In our case, most of us were Nam vets, and the exercise was a piece of cake. LOVED that our F-4’s beat the AF F-15’s in every dogfight. But that was the case because the F-15’s were flown with AF Captains and Lieutenants with maybe 500-700 hours in plane while our Phantoms were flown by Majors and Lt Col’s with at least 15,000 hours - in Phantoms!
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Your perspective on the “weekend warrior” concept is interesting, especially given the experience of many reservists. It seems that the blend of seasoned veterans and the training they received has led to significant effectiveness in operations.
The detail about the F-4s’ performance against the F-15s highlights how experience can outweigh raw hours in the cockpit. When you have pilots with extensive flight time in a specific aircraft, it can make a remarkable difference in outcomes during exercises.
This brings up a thought about how modern militia groups might approach their training. They could benefit from similar principles of cohesion and experience.
Do you think the integration of veterans with significant operational experience into these groups could lead to improved effectiveness, similar to what you’ve observed in your own military experience?
Kilroy was here